Abstract
Introduction
Protocols that are able to tolerate Byzantine faults have been extensively studied in the past 20 years [9, 171, and they have been applied to a number of well-known problems, such as consensus and group communication primitives with different order guarantees. These protocols are usually built for a system composed by a set of cooperating processes (or machines) interconnected by a network. The processes may fail arbitrarily, e.g., they can crash. delay or 'This work was panially supported by the EC. through projecr IST-1999~11583 (MAFTIA), and by the FCT. through the LargeScale Informatics Systems Laboratory (LASICE) and the project POSV1999lCHS133996 (DEFEATS) not transmit some messages. generate messages inconsistent with the protocol, or collude with other faulty processes with malicious intent. The synchrony assumptions about the network and process execution have either been the synchronous or the asynchronous models. Recent research in this area. however. has mostly focused on asynchronous systems, since this model is well-suited fur describing networks like the Internet and other WANs with unpredictable timeliness (examples can he found in [4, IX, 10. 8, 14, 
31).
The assuniption ofthis model has also one added advantage -the resulting protocol tolerates timing attacks.
Nevertheless, the asynchronous model has some drawbacks, and among them is the constrain that it imposes on the maximum number of processes that are allowed to Pail simultaneously. For instance, Bracha and Toueg showed that. assuming Byzantine faults. it is impossible to send reliable multicasts i f there are more than f = 9 tdUhy processes in a system with U processes [Z] . Their proof was valid even under strong assumptions about the network, such as the availability of reliable authenticated channels.
The main problem with these constraints is that they are difficult or impossible to substantiate in practical systems. since malicious faults (attacks and intrusions) may be performed by intelligent entities. If the machines contain a set of common vulnerabilities. it is quite feasible to build a program that is able to attack and compromise a large number of nodes in a short time.
This paper describes a new reliable multicast protocol for asynchronous systems with a hybrid failure model. The basic ideaof this type of model is to make distinct failure assumptions about different components of the system, ranging from arbitrary to fail-controlled. In our case, processes and network can behave in a Byzantine way, however, we assume the existence of a distributed security kernel that can only fail by crashing. This kernel only provides limited functionality, hut can he called by processes to execute a few small steps of the protocol. By relying on this kernel, our protocol is highly efficient, for instance in terms of message complexity, when compared with traditional protocols. Moreover, it imposes constraints on the number of process failures that are similar to accidental fault-tolerant protocols: for f faults, our protocol requires n 2 f + 2 processes, instead of n 2 3f + 1. In reality, our protocol does not impose a minimum number of correct processes.
However, in practice, we say that the number of processes has to be 71 2 f + 2 to denote the notion that the problem is vacuous if there are less than two correct processes. This was already pointed out by Lamport et al.
[9].
The design and implementation of the security kernel that is being considered, the Trusted Timely Computing Base (TTCB), has been presented elsewhere 151. Since this kernel is both secure and timely, it can offer security and time related services (see Section 2). These services can be utilized in a useful way by the processes because, by construction, the TTCB was implemented with the following fundamental objectives in mind: I ) the TTCB is a distributed component. with limited services and functionality, that resides inside potentially insecure hosts, yet is and remains reliable, secure and timely; and 2) it is possible to ensure correct -reliable, secure, timely-interactions between processes in the host. and that component.
The paper makes the.following two main contributions:
It presents a novel way of designing asynchronous Byzantine-resilient, protocols. which rely on a distributed security kernel to execute a few crucial steps.
IC describes a new.reliable multicast protocol which is highly efficient and imposes constraints on the number of faulty processes.in the order of 71 2 f + 2.
2 System Model and the TTCB Figure 1 presents the architecture of the system. Each host contains the typicalsoftware layers, such as the operating system and runtime environments, and an extra component, the 'ITCB. The TTCB is a distributed entity with local parts in the hosts and a control channel. The local parts, or local TTCBs. are computational components with activity, conceptually separate from the hosts' operating system. The conrrol channel is a private communication channel or network that interconnects the local TTCBs. It is conceptually separated from the payload network, the network used by the ,hosts to communicate. With the exception of the TTCB, the whole system is assumed to be asynchronous. We can make working assumptions on message delivery delays; they may even hold many times; we can (and will) use them to ensure system progress; but we can never assume that bounds are known or even exist. for message delivery or for the interactions between a process and the local 'ITCB.
The following sections describe the l T C B respectively :from the point of view of secufiry and timeliness. 
TTCB and Security
Most of the research and engineering on security aims at making complete systems secure, or at building concepts and mechanisms useful to reach this goal. The construction of a secure system is a hard task as the constant news of successful attacks show. In our work with the T K B , however, we have shown that it is feasible to build a secure distributed component with limited functionality [5] .
The idea of designing protocols with the assistance of a secure component is novel, and relies on the concept of hybrid failure assumptions. Fault-tolerant systems are usually built using either arbitrary or controlled failure asaumplions. Arbitrary failure assumptions consider that components can fail in any way, although in practice constraints have to be made. These assumptions are specially d equate for systems with malicious faults -attacks and intrusions [16]-since these faults are induced by intelligent entities, which are hard to restrict and model. Byzantine protocols follow this type of assumption since they consider that processes can fail arbitrarily, although they put limits on the number of processes that are allowed to fail. Controlled failure assumptions are used for instance in systems where components can only fail by crashing. Hybrid failure assumptions bring together these two worlds: some components are assumed to fail in a controlled way, while others may fail arbitrarily. The TTCB is suited for this type ofsystems because it only fails by crashing, and the rest of the system, e.g., the payload network. processes, and operating systems, can follow an arbitrary failure model. The protocol uses only two TTCB's securih-relaredservices. The Local Authentication service allows processes to communicate securely with the TTCB. The service authenticates the local TTCB before the process, and establishes a shared symmetric key between both 151.
The It is assumed that a correct process is capable of securely calling the interface of the local TTCB. i.e., an attacker can not systematically intercept, delay or substitute without detection the information exchanged between the process and the local TTCB (see discussion is Section 2.3). The last property. 7imeliness. only guarantees that by tsturt + TYgleernenf the decision is available at the local TTCB. Since the environment is asynchronous, it will probably take longer for the process to obtain the result (a call to function 77CBdecide can be arbitrarily delayed).
The interface ofthe agreement service has two functions:
out +TTCBpropose(eid, elist, Istart, decision, value) result eTTCB.decide(eid, tag)
A process calls 7TCB.propose to propose its value. eid is the unique identification of a process before the T T C B .
obtained using the Local Authentication Service. elist is a list with the eids of the processes involved in the agreement. tstart is a timestamp with the following objective.
Ideally the agreement should be executed when all processes in e l i s t proposed their value. However, if the service was to wait for all processes to propose, a malicious process would be able to postpone the service execution eternally simply by not proposing its value. The purpose of tsturt is to avoid this problem: when all processes proposed, the service starts; however, if the service is not initiated by tstort, then it s t m s at that instant and no more proposals are accepted. A proposal made after tstart is rejected and an error is returned. decision indicates the function that should be used to calculate the value that will be decided (the TTCB offers a limited set). value is the value proposed. Function TTCBqropose returns a structure out with two fields: out.ermr is an error code and out.tug is a unique identifier of the execution of the agreement. The TTCB knows that two calls to propose made by different processes pertain to the same agreement execution i f they have the same value for (elist, rsrarr, decision).
Processes call 7TCBdecide to get the result of the agreement. tug is the unique identifier returned by TTCBpopose, and is used to specify the agreement instance. resulr is a record with four fields: result.error gives an error code; resulr.value is the value decided; resu1r.pmposed-ok is a mask with one bit per process in elist, where each bit indicates if the corresponding process proposed the value that was decided or not; resukproposedany is a similar mask but that indicates which processes proposed any value.
TTCB and Time
From the point of view of time, the objective of the TTCB is to support systems with partial-synchmnous models. Research in distributed systems has traditionally been divided between two canonical models: fully synchronous and fully asynchronous. Partial-synchronous models try to give the best of both worlds, allowing timeliness specifications but accepting that they can fail [22. 61.
The TTCB provides a set of time services whose main objective is precisely to detect the failure of timeliness specificariorrs. This is only possible because theTTCB is timely,
i.e., the TTCB is a real-time (synchronous) component. Many of the time related ideas and services of the TTCB were based on the work of the Timely Computing Base [23] .
The protocol presented in this paper uses a single time service -the Trusted Absolute Timestamping Service. This service provides globally meaningful timestamps. It is possible to obtain timestamps with this characteristic because local TTCBs clocks are synchronized.
Processes and Failures
A process is correct if it always follows the protocol until the protocol completion. There are several circumstances, however, that might lead to a process failure. In an arbitrary failure model, which is the model being considered in this paper, no restrictions are imposed on process failures, i.e., they can fail arbitrarily. A process can simply stop working, or it can send messages without regard of the protocol, delay or send contradictory messages, or even collude with other malicious processes with the objective of breaking the protocol. In the rest of this section we will look into a few examples of attacks that are specific to our architecture, and that might lead to the failure of the corresponding process.
A personification attack can be made by a local adversary i f i t i s able to get the pair (eid, secret), which lets a process communicate securely with the local TTCB. Before a process starts to use the 'ITCB, i t needs to call the Local Authentication Service to establish a secure channel with the local T C B . The outcome of the execution of this procedure i s a pair (Bid: secret). where bid i s the identifier of the process and secret i s a symmetric key shared with the local TTCB. I f an attacker penetrates a host and obtains this pair, i t can impersonate the process before the R C B and the 'ITCB before the process.
Another personification attack i s possible if the attacker obtains the symmetric keys that a process shares with other processes. In this case, the attacker can forge some of the messages sent between processes. Most of the messages transmitted by the protocol being proposed do not need to be authenticated and integrity protected because corruptions and forgeries can be detected with the help of the TTCB. The only exception happens with the acknowledgments sent by the protocol. where i t i s necessary to add a vector of message authentication codes. A successful attack to a host and subsequent disclosure of the shared keys of a process, allows an attacker to falsify some acknowledgements. I f the keys can be kept secret, then he or she can only disrupt or delay the communication, in the host or the network.
A denial of service attack happens if an attacker prevents a process from exchanging data with other processes by systematically disrupting or delaying the. communication. I n asynchronous protocols typically i t i s assumed that messages are eventually received (reliable channels), and when this happens the protocol i s able to make progress. To implement this behavior processes are required to maintain a copy o f each message and to keep re-transmitting until an acknowledgement arrives (which might take a long time, depending on the failure). In this paper we decided to take a different approach: if an attacker can systematically disrupt the communication of a process, then the process i s considered failed as soon as possible, otherwise the attacker will probably disturb the communication long enough for the protocol to become useless. For example, if the payment system of an e-store i s attacked and an attempt of paying an item takes 10 hours (or 10 days) to proceed, that i s equivalent to a failure of the store. I n channels with only accidental faults it i s usually considered that no more than Od messages are corruptedlost in a reference interval of time. Od i s the omission degree and tests can be made in concrete networks to determine
Oil with any desired probability 1241. I f a process does not receive a message after Od + 1 retransmissions from the sender, with Od computed considering only accidental faults, then i t i s reasonable to assume that either the process crashed, or an attack i s under way. I n any case, we will consider the receiver process as failed. The reader, however, should notice that Od i s just a parameter of the protocol. I f Od i s set to a very high value, then our protocol will start to behave like the protocols that assume reliable channels.
Note that the omission degree technique lies on a synchrony hypothesis: we 'detect' omissions if a message does not arrive after a timeout longer than the 'worst-case delivery delay' (the hypothesis). Furthermore, we 'detect' crash i f the omission degree i s exceeded. In our environment (since it i s asynchronous, bursts of messages may be over-delayed, instead of lost) this artificial hypothesis leads to forcing the crash of live but slow (or slowly connected)
processes. There is nothing wrong with this. since it allows progress of the protocol, but this method i s subject to inconsistencies if failures are not detected correctly. In our system, we rely on the timing failure detector of the TTCB to ensure complete and accurate failure detection amongst all participants [23] , and feed a membership service complementing the reliable multicast protocol being described. These mechanisms are out of the scope of the present paper, but substantiate the correctness of the omission degree technique for asynchronous environments.
Protocol Definition and Properties
In each execution of a multicast there i s one sender process and several recipient processes. A message transmitted to a group should be delivered to all member processes (with the limitations mentioned below), including the sender. No assurances, however, are provided about the order of message delivery. Each process can deliver its messages in a distinct order. I n the rest of the paper, we will make the classical separation of receiving a message from the network and delivering a message -the result of the protocol execution.
Informally, a reliable multicast protocol enforces the following [2]: l) all correct processes deliver the same messages, and 2) i f a correct sender transmits a message then all correct processes deliver this message. These rules do not imply any guarantees o f delivery i n case of a malicious sender. However, one o f two things will happen, either the correct processes never complete the protocol execution and no message i s ever delivered, or i f they terminate, then they will all deliver the same message. No assumptions are made about the behavior of the malicious (recipient) processes.
They might decide to deliver the correct message, a distinct message or no message. (I) to indicate that no message exists, reud.rion.block.ing(). These two primitives only read messages with the same value of (elist: tsturt) which correspond to a given instance of the protocol execution. Other values of the pair are processed by other instances of the protocol. We assume that there is a garbage collector that throws away messages for instances of the protocol that have already finished running (e.g.. delayed message retransmissions). This garbage collector can be constructed by keeping in a list the identifiers of the messages already delivered and comparing these with the arriving messages.
With the exception of the beginning. the code presented in the figure is common both to the sender and the recipients. If the process is a sender, i t constructs and multicasts the message to the receivers (lines 3-4) . tstur.1 i s set to the current time plus a delay T I . TI should be proportional to the average message transmission time, i.e., it should be calculated in such a way that there i s a reasonable probability of message arrival before tsturt.
Recipient processes start by blocking, waiting for a message arrival (line 6). Depending on whether there are or not message losses, the received message might be of type D.AT or ACA' . or a corrupted message with the fields (ellst, tsturt) correct. The variable n-sends contains the number of messages that were multicast (lines 4 and 6).
Next, both sender and recipients propose the hash of the message, H ( M ) . to the agreement service (-44 i s the message transmitted by the sender, or the first message received by the recipient). and then they block waiting for the result of the agreement (line 7-8). The decision function used by the protocol. TTCB.TB.ARMULTfC..IST, selects as result the value proposed by the first process in elist, which in our case is the sender. A hash function is basically a one-way function that compresses its input and produces a fixed sized digest (e.g.. 12.8 bits for MDS). We assume that an attacker is unable to subvert the cryptographic properties of the hash function, such as weak and strong collision resistance [121. Since the system is asynchronous, there is always the possibility, although highly improbable, that the sender experiences some delay and it tries to propose after tstart. In this case, TTCByropose will return the error TTCBT'START-EXPIRED and the sender process should abort the multicast, and the application can retry the multicast later (for simplicity this condition is omitted from the code). If all processes proposed the same hash of the message, all can deliver and terminate (line 9). Recall that field proposed-ok indicates which processes proposed the same value as the one that was decided, i.e., H ( M ) . The second phase is executed if for some reason one or more processes did not propose the hash of the correct message by.tsturt. Variable M-deliver is used to store the message that should be delivered, and is initialized to a value outside the range of messages (line I I). The protocol utilizes message authentication codes (MAC) to protect ACK messages from forgery 1121. This type of signature is based on symmetric cryptography, which requires a different secret key to be shared between every pair of processes. Even though, MACs are not as powerful as signatures based on asymmetric cryptography, they are sufficient for our needs, andmore importantly, they are several orders of magnitude faster to calculate. Since ACKs are multicast to all processes, an ACK does not take a single MAC but a vector of MACs, one per each pair (sender of ACK, other process in elist) [4] . A MAC protects the information contained in the tuple (ACK, my-eid, M.elisf, Mmarf, decide.valueJ, and is generated using the secret key shared between each pair of processes (lines 12-13), Next, processes initialize variables n-ack and ark-set (line 14). The first one will count the (number of ACKs that have been sent. The second one will store the eid of the processes that have already confirmed 4 represents an execution of the protocol. The ' sender multicasts the message once, P2 receives it in time to propose H ( M ) , P3 receives the message late and P4 does not receive. When the agreement terminates all processes except P4 have the message and get the result from the TTCB (P4 does not even know that the protocol is being executed). At this point, by observing the result of the agreement, all become aware that only PI and P2 proposed the hash. Therefore, both PI and P2 multicast the message to P3 and P4. P3 multicasts an ACK to all processes confinning the reception and sends the message to P4. PI terminates at this moment because it has already sent the message Od + 1 times. The first message P4 receives is the ACK sent by P3. P4 saves it in ack-set and gets the result of the agreement. Then it receives the right message, and multicasts an ACK. At this moment all processes terminate.
Protocol Proof
This section proves that the protocol is a reliable multicast and tolerates f failures out o f f + 2 processes. In fact the protocol tolerates any number of faulty processes but the problem is vacuous if there are less than two correct processes. In those situations, the protocol definition does not impose any particular behavior.
In Section 2.3 we exemplified the cases in which a process was failed. Here we formalize those cases as a set of conditions. A process is failed (or not correct) i f FI. The process does not follow the protocol or it crashed.
. F2. The process can not communicate with the TTCB or is impersonated by an attacker, e.g., if the attacker managed to capture the process' pair (eid, secret).
F3. An attacker manages to falsify a MAC that should have been created by the process, e.g., if the attacker discovers one of the processes' symmetric keys. F4. The process can not send or receive successive copies of a message because its communication is systematically disrupted by an attacker. F5. The process does not get the result of an agreement because the TTCB discarded that result (the TTCB discards results after some time).
Theorem 1 BRM-M is a reliable mirlticast protocol rhar rolerates f failed processes our of ri 2 f + 2 processes.
Proof. The theorem is valid if the protocol verifies the three properties of Validity, Agreement and Integrity as defined previously (Section 3). The proof is developed in such a way that it imposes no limits on the number of faulty prncesses (only requires two correct processes). We prove each property in turn: is false, p' can also get H ( M ) from the TTCB agreement.
After receiving M and checking that it is the message corresponding to H ( M ) , p' will eventually deliver the message.
This proves that if a correct recipient delivers M then all correct recipients deliver M . A correct sender always delivers the message so this proves that the protocol verifies the Agreement property.
Integrity
For all messages with the same pair (elist. tsturt), every correct process runs a single instance of the protocol code. Additionally, an instance of the prntocol always returns after delivering a message (lines 9 and 29). Therefore. every correct process delivers a message M at most once. Any correct process not in .qraup(M), i.e., not in rlist, can not get H ( M ) from the TTCB, therefore it can not deliver M. Now let us prove the second part of the property. The process s e n d e r ( M ) is the process whose eid is the first in elist. The value returned by the agreement is the H ( M ) proposed by the first element in elist (decision TTCB-TBARMULTICAST in line 7). i.e., by sendrr(M) since it is correct (F2). Therefore, the value of H ( M ) returned by the agreement is always the value proposed by the sender. Consequently, a correct process can deliver a message .
U only if A t was previously multicast hy sender(.M), since a correct process follows the protocol (FI) and checks if the hash ofthe message it received is equal to H ( M ) (assuming the hash function is collision resistant).
Performance Evaluation

0
The experimental setting used to evaluate the protocol consisted of a COTS-based implementation of the TTCB described in [ 5 ] . The implementation of a TTCB has to be made highly secure to ensure (with high coverage) that our assumptions are not violated, otherwise, the protocol will not behave as expected. Therefore. the conceptual separation between local l T C B s and the operating systems has to be strongly enforced, since operating systems are in general attackable. This means, for instance, that local TTCBs could be implemented inside a hardware appliance board of some kind. In this case, the communication between that board and the rest of the host can be limited and therefore attacks against it can be prevented. The first implementation ofthe TTCB used a different approach. The local TTCB resides inside of a Real Time Linux Kernel (RT-Linux) and the separation is obtained by a set of security mechanisms.
This software-based version of the local TTCB has less coverage of the security assumptions than the one based on hardware, however, it is easier to deploy. Consequently, it becomes simpler to freely distribute the TTCB by the research community, allowing it to be tested and evaluated by other research groups. The I T C B control channel must also be protected. Currently. it is a dedicated Ethernet network, but other solutions are possible [SI.
More specitically the performance results were obtained on a system with five PCs, each containing a Pentium 111
processorrunning at 450 Mhz and 64 Mbytes of main memory. The operating system of all PCs was RT-Linux. The PCs were connected by two 100 Mbps Fast-Ethernet LANs. one for the general purpose payload network and another for the internal control network of the TTCB. The protocol was implemented in C, compiled with the standard gcc compiler. The hash function that was utilized was MD5. Whenever possible, the communication among processes was based on IP multicast. Five processes were used in the tests, each one running on a distinct PC, and we assumed a setting where all processes were correct, i.e.. no failed processes (f = 0). Throughout the experiments the value adopted for the omission degree was two (Od = 2). Each measurement was repeated at least 4500 times.
In the first set of experiments we tried to determine in which phase the protocol terminated. From the observed results, it is possible to conclude that for reasonable values of tstart. in the order of 2 ms, the protocol always terminates in the tirst (optimistic) phase. We noticed that although IP multicast is unreliable, all messages apparently reached the processes, and for this reason, they were able to propose their hash value before t s t w t (see Figure 3) . If messages were lost or if some of the processes were malicious, we would expect that in most cases the second phase would have had to be executed.
In the second set of experiments we obtained message delivery times for the protocol. Since the protocol always finishes at the end of the first phase, it is possible to use the following methodology to calculate the delivery times. One of the processes is randomly selected as the sender, and then it reliably multicasts a message M of a given size.
Then, immediately after delivery, a single recipient is selected to send a reply. This reply is an IP multicast for the same set of processes. with a message of the same size. For each execution of this procedure two times were measured the round-trip time and the recipient processing time. The round-trip time ( T T~) is obtained by the sender. and it corresponds to the time measured between the multicast and the reception of the reply. The recipient processing time (Tpruc) is the time taken between the reception of the message M in the recipient and its reply. This time includes all tasks executed by the recipient, such as hash calculation, and it corresponds mostly to the time waiting for the TTCB Agreement Service, i.e., calling TTCB.propose and waiting for TTCB-decide to return the result of the agreement (lines [7] [8] . If one assumes that an IP multicast always takes the same amount of time, we can use the following formula to calculate the protocols message delivery time:
(1) due to the TTCB Agreement. Consequently, we expect our protocol will perform better as the TTCB is optimized, and faster prutocols are used to implement the agrecment ser- The delivery time values exhibit a reasonably high standard deviation. Figure 6 displays the delivery times for 1000 executions of the protocol using a message data size of 0 bytes. The main explanation for this behavior is related to the internal implementation of the agreement service of the T K B . Currently. i t uses a time-triggered protocol wherc interactions with the network only happen every 4 ms (e.g., it only reads messages from the network at the beginning o f the 4 ms interval). Therefore, an agreement will take more or less time depending on the instant when processes propose their values within the 4 ms interval.
Related Work
There i s a significant amount of work in the area of reliable broadcasts for distributed systems -most of it. however, has focused on benign failures andlor assumed a synchronous model [7] . Reliable multicast protocols tolerating Byzantine faults make no assumptions about the behavior o f faulty processes (similar to "Byzantine agreement" i n the synchronous time model [Y] ). I n asynchronous systems, i t was proved a theoretical maximum that less than a third (f 5 9) process may he corrupted (21. I n our protocol, with the support of the 'ITCB. we can overcome this limit. and require only f 5 71 -2.
The Rampart toolkit contains a reliable multicast protocol where processes communicate through authenticated reliable channels and use public-key cryptography to digitally sign some of the messages [IS]. The protocol i s based on a simple echo protocol where the sender starts by multicasting a hash of the message, then it expecls a confirniation from a subset of the processes. and finally it multicasts the message (this protocol improves the echo protocol by Toueg [21] in terms of message complexity at the cost of more computation). Rampan assumes a dynamic membership provided by a protocol which also utilizes a three-phase commit strategy [ 191. Later, Malki and Reiter optimized the Rampart protocol using a method of chaining acknowledgments to amortize the cost o f computing the digital signatures through several messages [I l] . Malkhi, Merrit and Rodeh proposed a secure reliable multicast protocol based on dissemination quorums, as a way tu reduce delays specially in the case where f < I I [IO] . This protocol assumes similar channels and uses public key signatures as the previous protocols, hut considers, like i n [ I I], static membership.
The SecureRing system provides a reliable message delivery protocol that uses public key cryptography and assumes a fully connected network [XI. The multicast i s imposed on a logical ring, where a token controls who can send the messages. The Secure Trans protocol, which is implemented i n the SecureGroup system, uses retransmissions and acknowledgments to achieve reliable delivery o f messages [14] . These acknowledgments are piggybacked on messages that are themselves broadcasted. Each message i s digitally signed to ensure authenticity and integrity. Both systems, SecureRing and SecureCroup, provide support for dynamic group membership changes.
There are some secure group communication systems which consider a non Byzantine failure model: Horus, Ensemble and Secure Spread. These systems assume that communication can be attacked but that hosts do not fail. Secure multicast protocols based on message authentication codes are given explicitly for Horus and Secure Spread [ZO. I].
The B R M -M protocol does not need public key cryptography, one of the main bottlenecks o f group communication performance 141. since i t uses the TTCB to securely exchange a digest o f the message. In terms of the network we have assumed unreliable channels, which results on a message complexity proportional to the omission degree. This paper does not discuss the membershipservice. hut our protocol i s suited for dynamic groups, such as those based o n the M A R I A architecture 1161.
There i s a body of research, starling with 1131, on hybrid failure models that assume different failure type distributions for different nodes. For instance, some nodes are assumed to behave arbitrarily while others are assumed to fail only by crashing. Such a distribution might be hard to predict i n the presence of malicious intelligent entities, unless their behavior i s constrained in some manner. Our work might best be described as archirectural hybridization, i n the lines of works such as [15. 251, where failure assumptions are in fact enforced by the architecture and the construction of the system components, and thus well-founded.
Conclusion
The paper presents a new reliable multicast protocol for asynchronous systems with an hybrid failure model. This type of failure model allows some components to fail in a controlled way while others may fail arbitrarily. In our case, we assume the existence of a simple distributed security kernel, the TTCB, that can only fail by crashing, while the rest of the system can behave in a Byzantine way. By relying on the services of the TTCB, the protocol exhibits excellent behavior in terms of time and message complexity when compared with more traditional Byzantine protocols.
Moreover. it only requires 71 > f + 2 correct processes, instead of the usual 71 2 3 f + 1.
Besides describing a novel Byzantine-resilient protocol, the paper introduces the design of protocols based in our architectural hybrid failure model and, more specifically, the design of protocols using our distributed security kernel, the 'ITCB. In the future, we will pursuit these design principles to develop a complete suite of Byzantine-resilient groupcommunication protocols, which is being produced in the context of project MAFI'IA.
